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Abstract
In this work, we study notions of fairness in decision-making systems when individuals have
diverse preferences over the possible outcomes of the decisions. Our starting point is the seminal
work of Dwork et al. [ITCS 2012] which introduced a notion of individual fairness (IF): given
a task-specific similarity metric, every pair of individuals who are similarly qualified according
to the metric should receive similar outcomes. We show that when individuals have diverse
preferences over outcomes, requiring IF may unintentionally lead to less-preferred outcomes for
the very individuals that IF aims to protect (e.g. a protected minority group). A natural alter-
native to IF is the classic notion of fair division, envy-freeness (EF): no individual should prefer
another individual’s outcome over their own. Although EF allows for solutions where all individ-
uals receive a highly-preferred outcome, EF may also be overly-restrictive for the decision-maker.
For instance, if many individuals agree on the best outcome, then if any individual receives this
outcome, they all must receive it, regardless of each individual’s underlying qualifications for
the outcome.
We introduce and study a new notion of preference-informed individual fairness (PIIF) that
is a relaxation of both individual fairness and envy-freeness. At a high-level, PIIF requires that
outcomes satisfy IF-style constraints, but allows for deviations provided they are in line with
individuals’ preferences. We show that PIIF can permit outcomes that are more favorable to
individuals than any IF solution, while providing considerably more flexibility to the decision-
maker than EF. In addition, we show how to efficiently optimize any convex objective over the
outcomes subject to PIIF for a rich class of individual preferences. Finally, we demonstrate the
broad applicability of the PIIF framework by extending our definitions and algorithms to the
multiple-task targeted advertising setting introduced by Dwork and Ilvento [ITCS 2019].
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1 Introduction
Increasingly, algorithms are used to make consequential decisions about individuals. Examples
range from determining which content users see online to deciding which applicants are considered
in lending and hiring decisions. Automated decision-making comes with benefits, but it also raises
substantial societal concerns (cf. [O’N17] for a recent perspective). One prominent concern is that
these algorithms might discriminate against individuals or groups in a way that violates laws or social
and ethical norms [ASB+19, Tob19, Das18, Bog19]. Thus there is an urgent need for frameworks
and tools to mitigate the risks of algorithmic discrimination. A growing literature attempts to tackle
these challenges by exploring different fairness criteria and ways to achieve them.
One prominent framework for establishing fairness in algorithmic decision-making systems comes
from the seminal work of Dwork et al. [DHP+12], which introduced the notion of individual fairness
(IF). IF relies on a task-specific similarity metric that specifies, for every pair of individuals, how
similar they are with respect to the task at hand. Given such a metric, individual fairness requires
that similar individuals (according to the metric) be treated similarly, i.e., assigned similar outcome
distributions. This is formalized via a Lipschitz condition, requiring that for any two individuals i
and j, the distance between their outcome distributions is bounded by their distance according to
the metric. Although coming up with a good metric can be challenging, metrics arise naturally in
prominent existing examples (e.g. credit or insurance risk scores), and in natural scenarios (e.g. a
metric specified by an external regulator). Given an appropriate metric, individual fairness provides
powerful protections from discrimination.
Accounting for individuals’ preferences. Our work is motivated by settings in which individ-
uals may hold diverse preferences over the possible outcomes. Natural examples of such settings
include recommendation systems on professional employment websites where job-searchers have di-
verse considerations (geography, work-life balance, company culture, etc.) that affect their interest
in potential employers, and targeted advertising systems where different users have a wide variety
of preferences over the subset of ads they’d like to see out of an enormous set of possibilities. While
the metric-based IF constraints prevent myriad forms of discrimination that can arise in automated
decision-making systems, we argue that when individuals have different preferences over outcomes,
IF can be too restrictive. Specifically, we show that in such settings, ignoring individuals’ preferences
(as IF does) can come at a high cost to the very individuals that IF aims to protect.
We illustrate this observation using a simple example. Consider a university organizing a career
expo focused on software developer positions. The university would like to assign each graduating
student to (at most) a single interview slot with a prospective employer. To prevent discrimination,
the university would like to enforce individual fairness. For simplicity, we assume that there is an
unbiased metric for judging qualifications for software development roles across employers based on
GPA in the CS major. Consider candidates i, j, and k, who are all similarly qualified, and suppose
there are three employers X, Y , and Z. When the candidates are polled for their preferences, i
prefers X ≻ Y ≻ Z, j prefers Y ≻ Z ≻ X, and k prefers Z ≻ X ≻ Y (possibly due to geographic
and work-life balance considerations). Despite the diversity of their preferences, since i, j, and k are
all similarly qualified, IF requires that the candidates receive similar distributions over interviews
with the employers X, Y , and Z. Thus, IF rules out the allocation where each candidate gets their
most-preferred interview.
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This toy example demonstrates that IF can be overly-restrictive, preventing some solutions where
every individual is very happy with their outcome. Moreover, under IF, even the most socially-
conscious decision-maker may be forced to disregard the preferences of some groups of individuals
in order to satisfy the constraints. For example, if a decision-maker is required by IF to give
similar members of majority and minority populations similar outcomes, then the decision-maker
may choose the IF solution that gives everyone the outcome preferred by the majority, running the
risk of ignoring the preferences of historically-marginalized groups of individuals.
Faced with this shortcoming of IF, we consider alternative notions of fairness that may be better
suited to handle settings where individuals hold rich preferences over outcomes. The most natural
alternative notion is envy-freeness (EF) [Var74, Fol67], a classic game-theoretic concept of fair
division. A set of outcomes is said to be envy-free if no individual prefers the outcome given to
any other individual over their own. At first glance, EF seems like a promising solution concept
that addresses the concerns raised about IF: the decision where every individual receives their most-
preferred outcome is EF. Indeed, Balcan et al. [BDNP18] recently presented EF as an alternative
to IF in the context of fair classification.
However, we argue that EF may also be overly-restrictive, constraining the decision-maker in un-
reasonable ways. Returning to the example of the career expo, suppose another individual ℓ has
similar preferences to i, (X ≻ Y ≻ Z), but ℓ has a significantly lower GPA than i. Consider an
allocation where i receives their most-preferred interview X, but ℓ does not receive any interview.
In this case, ℓ envies i so this solution does not satisfy EF; nevertheless, the solution is reasonable
from a fairness perspective. Since i has a much better GPA than ℓ, it doesn’t seem unfair to give i
the interview with X over ℓ, especially if the interview spots are limited.
This expanded example highlights the need for distinguishing between outcome distributions that
might make some (or even all) individuals unhappy, from distributions that are unfairly discrimi-
natory ; articulating this distinction was an important conceptual contribution of the definition of
individual fairness [DHP+12]. Indeed, the unqualified individual ℓ might be unhappy that they do
not receive an interview; further, they might be even less happy when they see that the qualified
individual i received an interview with their top choice X. In the eyes of the task-specific similarity
metric, however, these two individuals are different – according to their GPAs, one is qualified,
the other – unqualified. Thus, IF does not consider such an outcome discriminatory. Furthermore,
deciding to assign no one to interviews (qualified and unqualified alike) might make no one happy,
but it is not unfairly discriminatory, since all individuals are treated similarly.
In this work, we adopt the perspective that given a suitable metric, solutions that are individually
fair provide strong protections from discrimination, even though they might not be envy-free. Armed
with this perspective, we seek to relax the IF requirements to allow for a richer set of solutions, while
still providing meaningful protections against discrimination.
1.1 This Work: Preference-Informed Fairness
Building on the perspective from [DHP+12], we propose and study the notion of preference-informed
individual fairness (PIIF). Our guiding principle is:
Allocations that deviate from individual fairness may be considered fair,
provided the deviations are in line with individuals’ preferences.
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Before describing PIIF, we establish some notation. We model a decision-maker’s policy π as a
mapping from individuals to allocations, i.e., distributions over outcomes. We assume that each
individual i has preferences over the possible allocations, where p i q denotes that i (weakly)
prefers allocation p to allocation q. To discuss notions of individual fairness, we assume that D
is a divergence where D(p, q) measures some distance between two allocations p, q (e.g. the total-
variation distance), and d is the task-specific metric where d(i, j) specifies the similarity between
individuals i and j.
Using this notation, we can restate the notions of IF and EF as follows. A policy π is individually-
fair (IF) if for all pairs of individuals i, j, the Lipschitz condition D(π(i), π(j)) ≤ d(i, j) is satisfied.1
A policy π is envy-free (EF) if for all individuals i, for all other individuals j, π(i) i π(j).
Preference-informed individual fairness. As in both IF and EF, PIIF establishes fairness by
comparing the allocation of each individual i to the allocation of every other individual j. For each
such comparison, PIIF requires that either π(i) satisfies individual fairness with respect to π(j) or
i prefers their allocation π(i) over some alternative allocation that would have satisfied individual
fairness with respect to π(j). More technically, for π to be considered PIIF for each individual i,
we require that for every other individual j there exists some alternative allocation pi;j that i could
have received that satisfies the IF Lipschitz condition with respect to π(j) and where i (weakly)
prefers their actual allocation π(i) to the IF alternative pi;j.
Definition (PIIF). A policy π that maps individuals to allocations satisfies Preference-Informed
Individual Fairness with respect to a divergence D, a similarity metric d, and individual preferences
{i}, if for every individual i, for every other individual j, there exists an alternative allocation p
i;j
such that:
• pi;j is individually fair w.r.t π(j): D
(
pi;j, π(j)
)
≤ d(i, j).
• i (weakly) prefers π(i) over pi;j: π(i) i p
i;j.
We emphasize that, in general, pi;j 6= pj;i; that is, the alternative chosen for i with respect to j’s
allocation need not be the same as that chosen for j with respect to i. Figure 1 provides a succinct
summary of the definitions of IF, EF, and PIIF.
PIIF preserves the spirit of the core interpersonal fairness guarantee of IF: for each individual i, for
every individual j who is similar to i, either i’s outcome distribution is similar to j’s, or i receives
an even better (more-preferred) outcome distribution. The main advantage of PIIF over IF is that
it allows for a much richer solution space, which can lead to preferable outcomes for individuals.
Further, PIIF does not restrict the allocations unnecessarily; as in IF, the constraints only bind
when a pairs of individuals are sufficiently similar according to the metric. In other words, PIIF –
unlike EF – permits solutions that may be disappointing to some individuals (i.e. where i envies j)
but should not be considered discriminatory (because i and j are substantially different according
to the task at hand).
Referring back to the career expo example, we note that the allocation where the three qualified
candidates i, j, and k (deterministically) interview with their preferred employer is PIIF. To see
1Throughout, we assume that d and D are scaled appropriately to be in the same “units.” That is, without loss
of generality, we assume the relevant Lipschitz constant in the IF-style constraints is 1.
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Individual Fairness (IF) Envy-Freeness (EF)
for every i, for every j: for every i, for every j:
D(π(i), π(j)) ≤ d(i, j) π(i) i π(j)
Preference-Informed Individual Fairness (PIIF)
for every i, for every j, there exists pi;j s.t.
D(pi;j, π(j)) ≤ d(i, j)
π(i) i p
i;j
Figure 1: Summary of individual fairness notions
this, consider i comparing their outcome to those of j and k under such an interview assignment.
Comparing with j, i prefers outcomeX to receiving outcome Y , which would satisfy the IF constraint
with respect to j. Similarly, she prefers X to Z, which would satisfy the IF constraint with respect
to k. Indeed, since i receives her preferred outcome, one can argue that there is no discrimination
against i in the allocation. Similar reasoning applies to j and to k. In fact, the allocation where
each individual deterministically receives their preferred outcome is always PIIF, a property we
find desirable for a fairness definition. Further, consider the allocation of ℓ, who we assumed was
significantly less qualified than i (and thus, j and k). If ℓ is sufficiently dissimilar to all other
candidates, then the scheduler can assign ℓ to any interview and still satisfy PIIF. To see this, note
that if d(ℓ, i) is sufficiently large, we can always take pℓ;i = π(ℓ), and the constraints for individual
ℓ with respect to i will be satisfied (with identical arguments when comparing ℓ to j and k).
1.2 Our Contributions
Our running example illustrates that in many reasonable situations (involving rich and diverse indi-
vidual preferences over outcomes), the existing notions of individual fairness and envy-freeness may
not capture an appropriate notion of fairness or may unnecessarily constrain the decision-maker.
In high-stakes domains, such as employment and personalized content selection, both limitations
are significant and may hinder adoption of fairness-conscious decision-making. We propose PIIF
as a relaxation of IF that addresses the identified shortcomings of existing notions while still pro-
viding meaningful protections against discrimination. We view this as an important conceptual
contribution in its own right.
With the motivation and definition for PIIF in place, we provide a comprehensive characterization
of the relationship between PIIF and other individual notions of fairness. In Section 2, we show
formally that PIIF can be viewed as a relaxation of both IF and EF; that is, any solution that
satisfies either IF or EF also satisfies PIIF. Further, we demonstrate that PIIF is a non-trivial
relaxation of both notions, by proving that there exist settings in which PIIF solutions cannot be
captured by IF or EF constraints alone, for any choice of metrics d, D and preferences.
To introduce PIIF, we have argued qualitatively that relaxing IF to PIIF allows for more preferable
outcomes for individuals. We quantify these claims by comparing the social welfare of a decision-
maker’s policy achievable under PIIF and under IF. In Section 3, we show optimal bounds on the
ratio of the best social welfare under PIIF to that under IF; the ratio can grow linearly in the
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number of individuals classified or in the number of possible outcomes grows.
With the definition and properties of PIIF in place, we turn our attention to the algorithmic question
of how to achieve PIIF. In Section 4, we show that for a rich family of individual preferences, there is
an efficient algorithm to minimize a convex objective subject to PIIF. The result follows by observing
that for structured classes of preferences, the set of PIIF constraints is convex. In particular, to
optimize over PIIF, we can augment the convex program defined for IF in [DHP+12] to capture
the additional preference constraints. As such, optimization subject to PIIF is only slightly more
complex than optimization subject to IF.
Finally, we demonstrate the versatility of the PIIF framework, by applying preference-informed
fairness in the context of targeted advertising (as studied by [DI19]). Recent empirical findings
demonstrate that the ad allocation algorithms run by online advertising platforms may result in
discrimination [DTD15, LT18, ASB+19] and are thus facing legal scrutiny [Upt18, Tob19, BTI19].
As such, developing formal frameworks for understanding fairness in such advertising systems is of
great importance. In Section 5, we extend our definition of PIIF and our results to the multiple-task
setting defined [DI19] to model fairness desiderata for the domain of large-scale targeted advertising.
We show that in this practically-motivated setting, IF still may restrict the social welfare consider-
ably compared to PIIF even when the individuals’ similarity and preferences are perfectly aligned!
The ratio of the best social welfare under PIIF to that of IF grows linearly in the number of tasks.
Organization. Sections 2-5 contain the technical details and proofs of our major contributions
with some results deferred to the appendix. We conclude in Section 6 with comparisons to other
related works and a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the current approach of preference-
informed fairness as well as directions for future investigations.
2 Preference-Informed Individual Fairness
Preliminaries. Given a set of individuals X , we consider policies that assign every individual to
an outcome in the set C. We allow randomized allocation rules π : X → ∆(C), where for each
individual i ∈ X , their allocation π(i) ∈ ∆(C) represents a distribution over outcomes c ∈ C. We
model individuals’ preferences by assuming that every individual i ∈ X has a reflexive and transitive
binary relation i that encodes their preferences over allocations in ∆(C); for p, q ∈ ∆(C), we use
p i q to denote that i (weakly) prefers p to q.
2 We use  to denote the set of individuals’ preference
relations, = {i}i∈X .
One important structured class of preference relations are those that admit a utility function. Here,
we assume each individual i ∈ X has a real-valued function over allocations ui : ∆(C)→ R, where
ui(π(i)) represents the utility to individual i from the allocation given by π. Given such a utility
function, p i q if and only if ui(p) ≥ ui(q).
With this technical notation in place, for completeness, we restate the three definitions of fairness.
Definition 2.1 (Individual Fairness). Given a divergence D : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ [0, 1] and a similarity
metric d : X × X → [0, 1], a policy π : X → ∆(C) is (D, d)-individually fair if for every two
2
i need not be total nor antisymmetric over ∆(C).
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individuals i, j ∈ X × X , the following Lipschitz condition holds.
D(π(i), π(j)) ≤ d(i, j) (1)
Definition 2.2 (Envy Freeness). Given a set of preferences , a policy π : X → ∆(C) is -envy-
free if for all individuals i ∈ X , and for all other individuals j ∈ X ,
π(i) i π(i) (2)
Definition 2.3 (Preference-Informed Individual Fairness). Given a divergence D : ∆(C)×∆(C)→
[0, 1], a similarity metric d : X × X → [0, 1], and a set of preferences , a policy π : X → ∆(C) is
(D, d,)-PIIF if for all individuals i ∈ X , for all other individuals j ∈ X , there exists an allocation
pi;j ∈ ∆(C) such that:
D
(
pi;j, π(j)
)
≤ d(i, j) (3)
π(i) i p
i;j (4)
Often, the divergence D, metric d, and preferences  will be fixed. In these contexts, we use
ΠIF,ΠEF,ΠPIIF to denote the set of IF, EF, and PIIF solutions, respectively.
2.1 PIIF relaxes IF and EF
We have argued informally that PIIF captures the appealing aspects of both IF (strong discrimina-
tion protections) and EF (respecting the preferences of individuals) without being overly prescriptive
in a way that might hurt individuals or the decision-maker. Our first result formalizes these claims,
by characterizing PIIF as a relaxation of both IF and EF. We show that any policy that is either
IF or EF is also PIIF.
Proposition 2.4. Fixing a divergence, the metric, and preferences, ΠIF ⊆ ΠPIIF and ΠEF ⊆ ΠPIIF.
As solution concepts, both IF and EF are always feasible, but for very different reasons: for IF,
any allocation that treats all individuals identically is feasible; for EF, the allocation that gives
everyone their most-preferred outcome is envy-free. Thus, both of these extreme solutions will also
be feasible for PIIF. In general, PIIF will be a strict relaxation of these concepts that allows for
interpolation between the notions. Intuitively, more diverse preferences of individuals tend to give
rise to richer sets of PIIF solutions compared to IF, and nontrivial metrics d (i.e., further from the
all-zeros “metric”) give rise to richer sets of PIIF solutions compared to EF. Given the right framing,
the proof of this result is almost immediate.
Proof. To see that an IF policy π satisfies PIIF, for each i, we take pi;j = π(i) for all j. Consider
an allocation π ∈ ΠIF. From the perspective of any individual i ∈ X , when comparing to individual
j ∈ X , if pi;j = π(i), then, by the fact that π satisfies IF, condition (3) is satisfied. By reflexivity of
i, (4) is also satisfied, so π ∈ Π
PIIF.
To see that an EF policy π satisfies PIIF, for each i, we take pi;j = π(j) for all j. Consider an
allocation π ∈ ΠEF. From the perspective of any i ∈ X , when comparing to j ∈ X , if pi;j = π(j),
then, condition (3) is satisfied trivially because D(π(j), π(j)) = 0. Since π satisfies EF, we know
that π(j) i π(i), so condition (4) also holds; thus π ∈ Π
PIIF.
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PIIF generalizes IF and EF. We remark that this intuition also shows that PIIF is a general-
ization of both IF and EF; that is, both notions can be “implemented” as special cases of PIIF. To
implement IF, we can set all individual’s preference relation i to be the trivial reflexive relation,
where for all allocations p, p i p, and for all nontrivial pairs p 6= q, p and q are incomparable. To
implement EF, we simply take d(i, j) = 0 for all i, j pairs. In other words, we can think of the set
of IF solutions as those where we require the alternative allocation for i compared to j to be i’s
actual allocation pi;j = π(i), and we can think of the set of EF solutions as those where we require
the alternative allocation for i compared to j to be j’s allocation pi;j = π(j).
PIIF is a meaningful relaxation of IF and EF. A natural question to ask is whether we need
to introduce a new definition of individual fairness. In particular, we might hope that we could
“implement” PIIF using IF with a metric that incorporates preferences or with EF with preferences
that incorporate distances. We argue that when there is a rich set of possible outcomes and a
correspondingly-rich set of possible preferences, such an approach is infeasible. In particular, PIIF
captures constraints that could not be cast within the language of IF or EF alone.
To build intuition, we revisit the career expo example: suppose that two similarly qualified individ-
uals i and j have a similar top choice (say, X), but disagree on their second choice (i prefers Y ,
whereas j prefers Z). Do these individuals have similar preferences or divergent ones? Intuitively, a
fair assignment could give them similar probabilities of seeing X, but different probabilities of seeing
Y and Z. Individual fairness treats all outcomes symmetrically for all individuals, and does not let
us make such distinctions. The following proposition strengthens this intuition, demonstrating that
there are in fact settings in which EF preferences cannot be encoded using any IF metric, and vice
versa. Note that this implies that PIIF – a relaxation of both notions – captures constraints that
cannot be cast within the language of IF or EF alone.
Proposition 2.5. There exists a set of preferences  such that for any choice of divergence D and
metric d
Π-EF 6= Π(D,d)-IF.
There exists a divergence-metric pair D, d such that for any choice of preferences ,
Π(D,d)-IF 6= Π-EF.
Proof. In both constructions, we will assume there are two disjoint groups of individuals S, T ⊆ X .
Consider two outcomes p, q ∈ C. Suppose  is such that for some i ∈ S and j ∈ T , p ≻i q and
q ≻j p. Consider any D and d: if D(p, q) ≤ d(j, i), then assigning p to j and q to i will be (D, d)-IF,
but it is not -EF; otherwise, if D(p, q) > d(i, j), then assigning p to S and q to T will not be
(D, d)-IF, even though it is -EF. Thus, no D, d can capture -EF.
Now take D to be total variation distance and consider a metric d where d(i, j) = 0 for i, j ∈ S ×S
and T × T , and d(i, j) = 1 for i, j ∈ S × T . Under this metric, assigning any fixed allocation to
everyone in S and any (potentially-different) fixed allocation to everyone in T is (D, d)-IF. Consider
some . If there is some i ∈ S such that p ≻i q or if there is some j ∈ T such that q ≻j p, then the
(D, d)-IF allocation that assigns q to every i ∈ S and p to every j ∈ T is not -EF.
Thus, for all individuals in i ∈ S ∪ T , i must be either the relation, where p ≡ q or the trivial
reflexive relation where p and q are incomparable. Suppose i, j ∈ S×S both have i=j=≡. Then,
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the solution that assigns p to i and q to j is -EF, but violates the Lipschitz condition of (D, d)-IF.
On the other hand, if there is some i ∈ S that holds the trivial reflexive relation, then the (D, d)-IF
solution that assigns p to all of S and q to all of T will not satisfy -EF, because p 6i q.
2.2 Metric Envy-Freeness
We arrived at PIIF by starting with the metric-based IF as a strong notion of nondiscrimination
and relaxing the notion to incorporate individuals’ preferences and allow for a richer set of so-
lutions while providing a meaningful protections against discrimination. A conceptually-different
approach towards these goals would start with preference-based EF, but allow the decision-maker
some freedom by incorporating distances between individuals. In particular, consider the following
relaxation of EF, which we call Metric Envy-Freeness (MEF), that intuitively captures the idea that
no individual should envy the allocation of any other similar individual.
Definition 2.6. Suppose each individual i ∈ X has a utility function ui : ∆(C) → R; let U =
{ui}i∈X . Given a similarity metric d : X ×X → R
+, a policy π : X → ∆(C) satisfies (d,U)-metric-
envy-freeness if for every individual i ∈ X , for every other individual j ∈ X ,
ui(π(i)) ≥ ui(π(j)) − d(i, j)
This definition starts with the envy-freeness constraint for utility-based preferences, but then relaxes
the constraint between i and j by their distance according to the metric. For the metric-utility
comparison of MEF to be meaningful, we assume that utilities and metric distances are normalized
to one another; without loss of generality, assume that each utility and metric distance is bounded
in [0, 1]. For each pair i, j, the notion interpolates between two extremes based on the value of
d(i, j): if d(i, j) = 0, then envy-freeness binds; when d(i, j) = 1, the allocation i receives is not
constrained by the allocation j receives.
As d(i, j) ≥ 0 for all pairs of individuals, MEF is clearly a relaxation of EF. That said, it’s not
immediately obvious how MEF relates to IF or PIIF. While conceptually different, we show that
MEF captures a closely-related notion of fairness to PIIF, in the special case where preferences are
given by structured utility functions. To relate MEF to PIIF, we need to assume the following
Lipschitz conditions.
Assumption (Lipschitz utility). A utility function u : ∆(C) → R is ℓ-Lipschitz with respect to
D : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ R+ if
|u(p)− u(q)| ≤ ℓ ·D(p, q).
Lipschitz utility functions are quite natural. For instance, takingD to be the total variation distance,
if individuals’ preferences admit an expected utility function, where each outcome has utility in [0, 1],
then individuals’ utilities will be 1-Lipschitz. In other words, individuals’ utilities are not highly
sensitive to very small changes in the allocation they receive.
Assumption (Reverse-Lipschitz utility). A utility function u : ∆(C) → R is ℓ-reverse-Lipschitz
with respect to D : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ R+ if
1
ℓ
·D(p, q) ≤ |u(p)− u(q)| .
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Reverse-Lipschitz utility functions are less natural. This assumption implies that no pair of outcomes
is valued very similarly. One natural setting where the reverse-Lipschitz condition holds nontrivially
is in the case of binary outcomes, where each individual prefers one outcome over the other. Under
these assumptions, we can show the following relationship between MEF and PIIF.
Theorem 2.7. Suppose D : ∆(C)×∆(C) → R+ is a divergence, d : X × X → R+ is a similarity
metric, and U = {ui} is a family of utility functions. Let 
U denote the family of preferences
induced by U . Consider a policy π : X → ∆(C). For some constant ℓ ≥ 1:
• Suppose for all i ∈ X , ui is ℓ-Lipschitz with respect to D. Then,
Π(D,d,
U )-PIIF ⊆ Π(ℓ·d,U)-MEF.
• Suppose for all i ∈ X , ui is ℓ-reverse-Lipschitz with respect to D. Then,
Π(d,U)-MEF ⊆ Π(D,ℓ·d,
U )-PIIF.
Proof. To see that PIIF implies MEF, we start with a policy π that satisfies (D, d,U )-PIIF. To
establish MEF, we compare the utility of individual i on their allocation π(i) to that of another
individual π(j); we denote by pi;j the alternative allocation for i that satisfies the PIIF constraints.
ui(π(i)) ≥ ui(p
i;j) (5)
≥ ui(π(j)) −
[
ui(π(j)) − ui(p
i;j)
]
≥ ui(π(j)) − ℓ ·D
(
π(j), pi;j
)
(6)
≥ ui(π(j)) − ℓ · d(i, j) (7)
where (5) follows by the fact that π satisfies PIIF; (6) follows by the Lipschitz condition; and (7)
follows again from the fact that π satisfies PIIF. Thus, ui(π(i)) ≥ ui(π(j)) − ℓ · d(i, j), so π is
(ℓ · d,U)-MEF.
To see that MEF implies PIIF, we start with a policy π that satisfies (d,U)-MEF. To establish PIIF,
we consider an arbitrary pair of individuals i and j, and exhibit an allocation pi;j that satisfies the
PIIF conditions with respect to π(i) and π(j). Comparing individual i to individual j, we consider
two cases.
First, suppose ui(π(i)) ≥ ui(π(j)) and take p
i;j = π(j). In this case, the Lipshitz constraint is
trivially satisfied,
D(pi,j, π(j)) = D(π(j), π(j)) = 0 ≤ ℓ · d(i, j)
and the assumption that ui(π(i)) ≥ ui(π(j)) implies that
π(i) i π(j) = p
i;j,
so the PIIF constraints are satisfied.
Next, suppose ui(π(i)) < ui(π(j)) and take p
i;j = π(i). In this case, the preference condition is
trivially satisfied,
π(i) i π(i) = p
i;j
9
and the Lipschitz condition follows as
D(pi;j, π(j)) = D(π(i), π(j))
≤ ℓ · (ui(π(j)) − ui(π(i))) (8)
≤ ℓ · d(i, j) (9)
where (8) follows by the reverse-Lipschitz condition and (9) follows by the fact that π satisfies MEF.
Thus, π is (D, ℓ · d,U )-PIIF.
Relating PIIF and MEF. Theorem 2.7 shows that under appropriate assumptions, we can relate
the notions of PIIF and MEF. We interpret the theorem to say that, in most settings we would
apply preference-informed fairness, MEF is a strictly more relaxed notion than PIIF; that is, every
PIIF solution will be MEF, but there will be MEF solutions that do not satisfy PIIF.
Specifically, as we remarked earlier, it is reasonable to assume that individuals’ utility functions
are 1-Lipschitz with respect to D. In this case, small changes in the allocation according to D
cannot result in dramatically different utilities, and Theorem 2.7 says that (D, d,U )-PIIF implies
(d,U)-MEF.
In general, with a rich set of outcomes, we do not expect that individuals’ utility functions will be
reverse-Lipschitz with respect to D. As such, there are cases when (d,U)-MEF will be considerably
more relaxed than (D, d,U )-PIIF, allowing for deviations from (D, d)-IF that do not give utility
improvements for all individuals. To see this point, consider the following example with two indi-
viduals i, j, where d(i, j) = 0.5 and two outcomes p, q, with the utility functions of i and j defined
as follows.
p q
ui 1.0 0.5
uj 0.5 1.0
We take D to be the total variation distance between allocations. It’s easy to verify that all
allocations that treat the individuals identically and the welfare-maximizing solution where i receives
p and j receives q will be MEF; this can be seen by noting that each of these solutions satisfies EF,
thus, also MEF. In fact, in this example, the utility functions are sufficiently Lipschitz to guarantee
that all PIIF solutions will be MEF.
On the other hand, consider the allocation where i receives q and j receives p, deterministically.
This solution is not IF, because 1 = D(q, p) > d(i, j) = 0.5, nor EF, because both individuals envy
the others’ solution. Further, the solution is not PIIF. To see this, note that because each individual
receives their least favorite outcome, the only surrogate pi;j that can be chosen for individual i such
that q i p
i;j is pi;j = q (similarly, pj;i = p for individual j). As the actual allocation is not IF, one
of the PIIF constraints will be violated.
Still, this allocation does satisfy MEF. Specifically, 0.5 = ui(q) ≥ ui(p) − d(i, j) = 1.0 − 0.5 and
0.5 = uj(p) ≥ uj(q)− d(j, i) = 1.0− 0.5. In other words, in this instance, MEF allows for a solution
that is not permitted by any of the other notions of individual fairness we consider. In particular,
the allocation deviates from individual fairness in a way that does not help either individual. This
example suggests that in reasonable settings, MEF is a strictly weaker concept than PIIF and may
be too permissive.
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3 Welfare under IF, EF, and PIIF
In order to motivate PIIF, we argued that IF may be overly-restrictive and limit the “quality” of
solutions from the perspective of individuals. In this section, we formalize this claim, showing that
PIIF admits solutions that can be significantly more preferable to individuals. We quantify the idea
of individual quality using the game-theoretic notion of social welfare.
We restrict our attention to the common setting where individuals hold preference relations that
admit a utility function. In this setting, given a policy π, we can track the social welfare of the
policy, defined to be the overall utility experienced by individuals.
Definition 3.1. Given a policy π : X → ∆(C), social welfare W(π) is the sum of the individuals’
utilities under π.
W(π) =
∑
i∈X
ui(π(i)) (10)
For a collection of allocations Π, we let W∗(Π) = maxπ∈ΠW(π) denote the optimal social welfare
achievable by any allocation in Π, and let W∗ = W∗(∆(C)X ) denote the optimal (unconstrained)
social welfare.
An important special case of preferences that admit a utility function are those that admit an
expected utility function. Using such preferences is a standard approach in economics for modeling
decision-making in the presence of uncertainty.3
Definition 3.2 (Expected utility representation). A preference relation  admits an expected utility
representation if and only if there exists a function u : C → R+, such that for any two allocations
p, q ∈ ∆(C),
p  q ⇐⇒
∑
c∈C
pc · u(c) ≥
∑
c∈C
qc · u(c) (11)
Individual fairness may restrict social welfare. Using the notation introduced above, note
that W∗(ΠPIIF) =W∗ because the welfare-maximizing allocation is feasible for PIIF. Here, we aim
to understand how much IF may restrict the best social welfare compared to PIIF, by relating
W∗(ΠIF) to W∗.
Intuitively, social welfare can be hurt significantly by requiring IF compared to PIIF when many
individuals are considered similar, but there is a diversity of preferences over outcomes. Formal-
izing this intuition, we argue that without any assumptions about the class of utility functions of
individuals, the ratio between the best social welfare under IF and PIIF can grow with the number
of individuals. Further, even under the stronger assumption that individuals’ preferences admit an
expected utility representation, the ratio can grow with the number of outcomes.
Theorem 3.3. There exists a family of instances such that
W∗
W∗ (ΠIF)
≥ |X | .
3Although not all preference relations admit this form, a rich class of preferences do. For example, different levels
of tolerance towards risk can be captured within this framework (e.g., a risk-averse individual would have a utility
function u which is concave). Von Neumann and Morgensterm [VNM07] provide a complete characterization of this
class of preference relations.
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Additionally, there exists a family of instances where individuals’ preferences admit an expected
utility representation and
W∗
W∗ (ΠIF)
≥ |C| .
Proof. The two claims of the theorem follow by similar constructions. Suppose every individual is
considered similar according to d; that is, for all i, j ∈ X × X , d(i, j) = 0. This means that any
IF solution must assign every individual the same distribution over outcomes. To show the gaps,
we will compare the best IF solution (i.e. constant allocation) to the welfare-maximizing solution,
which is feasible under PIIF.
To begin, suppose we allow individuals to specify arbitrary utility functions; let each individual
i ∈ X hold a distinct pi ∈ ∆(C) (i.e., pi 6= pj for all i 6= j) such that ui(pi) = 1 and ui(q) = 0 for
any q 6= pi. In this case, the optimal social welfare is W
∗ = |X |. For any fixed allocation, however,
the best social welfare is to choose a distribution over the set of {pi}. Any such distribution will
achieve welfare 1; thus, W∗(ΠIF) = 1.
Now, suppose every individual is required to specify an expected utility representation. Let each
individual choose some c ∈ C, such that a 1/ |C|-fraction of individuals prefer each outcome c; let
ui(c) = 1 for their preferred outcome and ui(c) = 0, otherwise. Again, the optimal social welfare is
W∗ = |X |. Under any policy that assigns every individual the same fixed allocation p, the social
welfare is given by
∑
i∈X
∑
c∈C pc · ui(c) =
|X |
|C| ·
∑
c∈C pc =
|X |
|C| . Thus, W
∗(ΠIF) = |X ||C| .
We note that the gaps demonstrated in Theorem 3.3 are optimal in their settings. In particular, any
constant allocation will be IF, and we can always recoup a 1/ |X | fraction of the social welfare with
a constant allocation tailored for the individual with the highest utility. Further, in the case where
preferences admit an expected utility representation, we can choose the constant allocation on the
c ∈ C of maximum welfare. Finally, we note that one unsatisfying aspect of these constructions is
that they rely on the fact that all individuals are similar according to d. In Section 5.1, we show
that in the multiple-task setting of [DI19], such gaps exist even with nontrivial metrics that seem
to be aligned with social welfare.
PIIF does not guarantee social welfare. Because PIIF is a relaxation of IF, the best social
welfare achievable under PIIF is always at least that of IF. That said, because PIIF is a strict
relaxation of IF, it does not necessarily guarantee that every allocation’s social welfare improves
under PIIF. In particular, when the decision-maker seeks to optimize a utility function that runs
against individuals’ utilities within the set of PIIF solution, the obtained social welfare may be
arbitrarily worse under the PIIF constraints than IF constraints.
Suppose that the decision-maker has an additive utility function of the form f(π) =
∑
i∈X fi(π(i)),
for fi : ∆(C) → R. Let π
IF
f = argmaxπ∈ΠIF f(π) and π
PIIF
f = argmaxπ∈ΠPIIF f(π) denote the
optimal IF (resp., PIIF) solution in terms of f(·).
Proposition 3.4. There exists a family of instances and an additive utility function f such that
W(πPIIFf ) = 0 <W(π
IF
f ).
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Proof. Suppose there are two disjoint classes of individuals, S and T , which each make up half of X ,
and all individuals are similar; for all i, j ∈ X × X , d(i, j) = 0. Suppose there are three outcomes
C = {p, q, r}. Consider the utility functions defined as follows.
p q r
fi∈S 1/2 + ε 1 0
fj∈T 1/2 + ε 0 1
ui∈S 1 0 0
uj∈T 1 0 0
Under IF, the decision-maker must treat all individuals identically. Given this constraint, the
outcome that maximizes f is allocating p deterministically to everyone. This allocation πIFf achieves
W(πIFf ) = 1. Without the constraint that all individuals’ allocations are identical, the allocation
that assigns q to individuals from S and r to individuals from T maximizes f . In fact, this allocation
will be feasible for PIIF: note that every individual experiences 0 utility from everyone’s allocation,
so no one envies anyone else; under PIIF, envy-free solutions are feasible. Thus, W(πPIIFf ) = 0. In
fact, this reveals that the proposition holds not only for PIIF, but also for any notion that relaxes
EF.
This construction demonstrates that the PIIF constraints alone do not guarantee improved social
welfare compared to the IF constraints. We remark, however, that this is in line with our initial
motivation for PIIF: decoupling the objective of provably preventing discrimination from the ob-
jective of ensuring beneficial outcomes in aggregate. Finally, we note that if this is a concern, it
can be addressed within our framework by adding a constraint to the optimization program, dis-
cussed in detail in Section 4, that ensures the social welfare is above some baseline. In particular,
an appropriate individually fair solution could act as this baseline, by first computing the social
welfare obtained by it and then requiring that the resulting PIIF solution has at least this social
welfare. At the extreme, we could even add such a constraint on the utility experienced by each
individual; thus, obtaining the guarantee that any deviations from an IF solution are optimal, from
the individuals’ perspective, compared to some benchmark IF solution.
4 Optimization subject to PIIF
As we have argued, satisfying PIIF is always feasible: on the one hand, we can take any IF solution,
including a trivial policy that treats all individuals identically; alternatively, we can take any EF
solution, including the welfare-maximizing policy that gives everyone their most-preferred allocation.
In this section, we study the question of efficient optimization of a decision-maker’s utility function
subject to PIIF constraints. As is standard in much of learning and optimization, we frame this
task as the following minimization problem:
minimize
π:X→∆(C)
f(π)
subject to π ∈ ΠPIIF
In this section, we answer the question of feasibility of efficient optimization in the positive when f
is convex, and the preferences arise from a structured, but rich class of relations.
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4.1 Structured preferences
In principle, PIIF can be instantiated with any notion of preference. Without assuming anything
about the preferences, however, the PIIF constraints could be difficult to handle: the space of
allocations, over which the PIIF constraints are defined, is exponential. In realistic settings, where
the number of individuals or outcomes is large, this exponential dependence may be intractable.
Towards efficient optimization, we focus on two rich and structured preference classes.
First, we include the prominent class of preferences that admit an expected utility representation,
as defined in Definition 3.2. Additionally, we include the class of stochastic domination preferences.
Stochastic domination formalizes the intuition that for any distribution over outcomes, a shift of
probability mass from less desirable outcomes to more desirable outcomes is considered preferable.
Viewing an allocation p ∈ ∆(C) as a discrete probability distribution, we denote by c ∼ p an
outcome randomly sampled from p.
Definition 4.1 (Stochastic domination). For an individual with a utility function u : C → [0,M ]
and for any two allocations p, q ∈ ∆(C), p stochastically dominates q if
p  q ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ [0,M ], Pr
c∼p
[u(c) ≥ x] ≥ Pr
c∼q
[u(c) ≥ x]
That is, an allocation p is (weakly) preferred over q if for every possible level of utility x, the
probability of achieving at least x is no worse under p than it is under q. Note that stochastic
domination represents an interesting example of a non-total preferences, as two allocations may be
incomparable.4
4.2 Efficient optimization subject to PIIF
Here, we prove that when individuals’ preferences are of the forms defined above, the PIIF con-
straints admit efficient optimization. Formally, the following theorem demonstrates that when the
divergence over allocations D is taken to be total variation distance Dtv, and assuming oracle access
to the individual-fairness metric d, we can write the PIIF constraints as a set of (polynomially-many)
linear inequalities; thus, we can efficiently minimize any convex objective f .
Theorem 4.2. Let = {i}i∈X be the set of individuals’ preferences. If every i is either the
stochastic domination relation or admits an expected utility representation, then the set of (Dtv, d,)-
PIIF allocations forms a convex polytope in Rk, where k = poly (|X | , |C|).
Proof. We specify the PIIF constraints using the following variables: for all i ∈ X , let π(i) ∈ ∆(C)
be a vector denoting the actual allocation; for every pair of individuals (i, j) ∈ X×X , let pi;j ∈ ∆(C)
be a vector denoting the alternative allocation for i when comparing to j. We argue that the PIIF
constraints given in (3) and (4) can each be written as linear inequalities over these variables.
First, sinceD is taken to be the total variation distance we can translate (3) as 12 ·
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣pi;jc − π(j)c∣∣∣ ≤
d(i, j). This can be written as 2 · |C|+1 linear inequalities (with the introduction of |C| additional
variables representing the absolute values).
4We remark that this preference notion is a special case of the statistical concept of first-order stochastic domina-
tion [HR69, Baw75].
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Next, we turn to the constraint given in (4). First, consider the case of the preference relations
admitting an expected utility form. Let ui be the utility function for individual i. By definition,
π(i) i p
i;j ⇐⇒
∑
c∈C
π(i)c · ui(c) ≥
∑
c∈C
pi;jc · ui(c).
Thus, for every i ∈ X , the PIIF constraint given in (4) with respect to j ∈ X can be written as a
linear inequality in the variables pi;j and π(i).
Next, we consider the case of the stochastic domination preference relation. We introduce some
notation as follows. Fix an individual i and their allocation, π(i). Suppose |C| = k, and that
the outcomes in C are labeled in decreasing order according to i’s preferences: ui(c0) ≥ ui(c1) ≥
· · · ≥ ui(ck−1). With this ordering in place, we have that for any allocation p ∈ ∆(C) and every
rank r ∈ [k], Prc∼p [ui(c) ≥ ui(cr)] =
∑r
t=1 pt. Thus, for each i ∈ X we can write the stochastic
domination condition as k linear inequalities for each j ∈ X , where
π(i) i p
i;j ⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ [k] :
∑
t∈[r]
π(i)t ≥
∑
t∈[r]
pi;jt .
Importantly, this demonstrates that for this preference relation, the constraint given in (4) can be
enforced using an additional O (|C|) linear constraints, one for every r ∈ [k].
Other notions of preference Theorem 4.2 focuses on the case in which individuals’ preferences
satisfy one of the two forms discussed above and formalized in Definitions 3.2 and 4.1. Naturally,
however, not all preference relations satisfy one of these two forms. Appealing examples include
preferences where the individual deems some of the outcomes to be substitutes (i.e., interested in
exactly one) or complements (i.e., only interested in the complete set) or possibly preferences that
value diversity of outcomes. We leave the question of whether PIIF admits efficient optimization
over such non-convex preferences as an interesting direction for future research.
5 Fairness in Targeted Advertising: Multiple-Task PIIF
In this section, we extend the definition and study of preference-informed individual fairness to
the multiple-task setting, formalized and studied by Dwork and Ilvento [DI19]. This setting was
introduced as a model in which to study fairness in targeted advertising, a form of online adver-
tising where ad platforms allow advertisers to specify the characteristics of users they would like
to reach, and then make algorithmic decisions as to which users will see which ads based on the
advertiser specifications, predictions of ad relevance to individuals, and the ad platform’s revenue
objectives. Targeted advertising has become pervasive and increasingly moderates individuals’ ex-
posure to opportunities. In recent years, numerous concerns have been raised about its fairness
and discrimination implications, ranging from concerns about discriminatory advertiser targeting
practices enabled by the platforms [ATV17, TM18, AST17] to concerns about the ad delivery and
allocation algorithms run by the platforms introducing bias where none was intended by the adver-
tiser [DTD15, LT18, ASB+19, Upt18, Tob19]. As part of a lawsuit settlement, the most prominent
targeted advertising platform, Facebook, has begun to take steps to ensure advertisers cannot dis-
criminate in their targeting practices [San19]. However, the question of how to ensure that the ad
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delivery and allocation algorithms do not lead to discrimination is wide open [ASB+19, Mur19],
in part due to lack of agreement over fairness definition(s) and ad platforms’ concerns that exist-
ing definitions will restrict allocations in ways that significantly impact their revenue. As such,
the multiple-task setting in the presence of individual preferences provides an important model to
investigate formal guarantees of non-discrimination without being overly-restrictive for the decision-
maker.
In the multiple task setting, we think of the set of outcomes C as arising from a collection of distinct
tasks, e.g. deciding whether to show an ad for a user of each ad campaign c ∈ C. Importantly, in
this setting, a separate fairness metric dc is specified for each task (ad campaign), which naturally
models real-world concerns in advertising, where different types of ads (e.g. housing, employment,
product) are subject to different regulations and standards of fairness.
Definition 5.1 (Multiple-task IF). An allocation π : X → ∆(C) is said to be (D, {d1, . . . dk})-
individually fair in the multiple-task setting if for every two individuals i, j ∈ X ×X , the task-specific
Lipschitz condition holds for each task:
∀c ∈ C : D(π(i)c, π(j)c) ≤ dc(i, j).
In this setting, and particularly its application to ad delivery in the targeted advertising context,
the benefits of a preference-informed approach to ensuring fairness become particularly salient. For
instance, consider the following example, due to [DI19]. Suppose there are two ad campaigns, one
for a high-paying tech job and another for childrens’ toys. The ad-specific metrics capture the
fact that differentiating based on a particular criteria could be permissible in some cases and not
in others. For example, the metric associated with the tech ad should assign a small distance to
individuals of similar qualifications regardless of their status as a parent, whereas the metric for
toys might reasonably assign significant distance between parents and non-parents. However, under
Multiple-task IF, a parent that is qualified for the tech job ad but is interested in toys must see
the tech ad with the same probability as a qualified non-parent – an overly restrictive requirement.
PIIF in the multiple-task setting addresses precisely this issue.
Definition 5.2 (Multiple-task PIIF). An allocation π : X → ∆(C) satisfies (D, {d1, . . . dk} ,)-
preference-informed individual fairness in the multiple-task setting if for all individuals i ∈ X , for
all other individuals j ∈ X , there exists an allocation pi;j ∈ ∆(C) such that:
∀c ∈ C : D
(
pi;jc , π(j)c
)
≤ dc(i, j)
π(i) i p
i;j
Again, in the multiple-task setting, the preference-informed extension of IF will require that for
every individual i ∈ X , when comparing to every other individual j ∈ X , the individual i prefers
their actual allocation to some alternative allocation, pi;j. The main distinction is that now pi;j has
to satisfy multiple-task IF with respect to j’s current allocation.
Efficient optimization. Our results regarding efficient optimization subject to PIIF from the
single-task setting (Section 4) directly extend to the multiple-task setting. In particular, given
the ad-specific metrics, individuals’ utilities and the advertisers’ bids, the platform can efficiently
compute the revenue- (or social welfare-) maximizing PIIF allocation.
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An interesting direction for future work is relaxing the full information assumption. In particular,
an online model, in which allocations are determined on a per-user basis, could naturally be more
applicable, as well as allow for the preferences to be “discovered” through the allocation procedure
(see [GJKR18] for a similar approach wrt the metric itself). This may necessitate investigation of
non-trivial tradeoffs, as learning individuals’ preferences requires some exploration, which may be
at odds with ensuring fair treatment.
5.1 Fairness and social welfare in the multiple-task setting
The construction of Proposition 3.3 demonstrates that in the single-task setting, the gap between
the best social welfare obtainable under IF and PIIF can be large even under very structured
classes of preferences. This construction can be generalized to the multiple-task setting; however,
an unconvincing aspect of it is the requirement that every individual is identical according to the
metric. In such a setting, it’s not surprising that IF is overly-constrained.
Here, we describe a family of instances in the multiple-task setting where the per-task similarity
is perfectly aligned with individuals’ utilities; that is, if two individuals benefit similarly from an
outcome c, then they are similar. In such instances, we’d expect that the metric constraints would
be perfectly aligned with social welfare. Still, we show that this intuition does not carry through
for multiple-task IF: for a set of tasks, there are instances where the optimal social welfare under
PIIF approaches a factor |C| larger than the best IF solution.
Theorem 5.3. For any constant ε > 0, there is a sufficiently large |X | such that there exists a
distribution of multiple-task instances where for each task c ∈ C, dc(i, j) = |ui(c)− uj(c)| and
W∗
W∗ (ΠIF)
≥ |C| − ε.
Intuition. Our proof is inspired by a construction of [DI19], which shows the impossibility of
multiple-task IF under “naive composition.” We begin by adapting their construction to our setting.
Suppose there are two subpopulations of individuals S ⊆ X and T = X \ S. We assume that
each task-specific similarity metric dc is determined by individuals’ utility: dc(i, j) = |ui(c) − uj(c)|.
Additionally, suppose there are two ad campaigns c0 and cS . c0 is a generic campaign where for
all individuals i ∈ X , ui(c0) = 1; thus, dc0(i, j) = 0 for all i, j ∈ X × X . cS is targeted where
subpopulation S receives nontrivial utility, but the rest of the population receives no utility; thus,
dcS treats pairs within S×S similarly, pairs from T ×T similarly, but for i, j ∈ S×T , is arbitrarily
large, say dcS (i, j) = 1.
Given these campaigns, a natural allocation of ads to individuals, which we call πW , deterministically
assigns πW(i) = cS to all individuals in i ∈ S since they receive positive utility from cS . Further, it
assigns the untargeted campaign πW(j) = c0 to individuals in j ∈ T because they benefit positively
from seeing c0, whereas they get no benefit from cS . Indeed, π
W maximizes the social welfare;
everyone sees their favorite ad. But πW violates multiple-task IF on c0; that is, for i, j ∈ S × T ,∣∣πW(j)c0 − πW(i)c0∣∣ = 1 but dc0(i, j) = 0. Intuitively, under multiple-task IF, because everyone in
X is similar according to c0, the platform must decide whether it is more beneficial to show cS to
the individuals in S at the expense of not being able to show c0 to the individuals outside of T .
The proposition follows by extending this construction beyond the case of two campaigns and two
subgroups, and carefully constructing utility functions for individuals.
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Proof. Suppose |C| = n. Let t ∈ N be some constant. Suppose the universe of individuals X =
S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . . Sn−1 is partitioned into disjoint subpopulations (Sℓ ∩ Sm = ∅ for ℓ 6= m) for |X | ≥ t
n.
The subpopulations will become progressively smaller as ℓ increases; for each ℓ > 0, |Sℓ||X | = 1/t
ℓ and
let |S0||X | = 1−
∑n−1
ℓ=1
|Sℓ|
|X | .
Notationally, for all ℓ ∈ [n], let Tℓ =
⋃
m≥ℓ Sm. We construct individuals’ utilities as follows: for
each ℓ ∈ [n], for each individual i ∈ X ,
ui(cℓ) =
{
tℓ if i ∈ T ℓ
0 otherwise
First, note that for individuals i ∈ Sℓ, cℓ maximizes their utility ui(cℓ) = t
ℓ. So consider the welfare-
maximizing allocation that assigns every individual in Sℓ to campaign cℓ; this allocation satisfies
PIIF. The average social welfare can then be written as:
1
|X |
·
n−1∑
ℓ=0
∑
i∈Sℓ
ui(cℓ) =
|S0|
|X |
+
n−1∑
ℓ=1
|Sℓ|
|X |
· tℓ
=
(
1−
n−1∑
ℓ=1
t−ℓ
)
+
n−1∑
ℓ=1
t−ℓ · tℓ
= n−
n−1∑
ℓ=1
t−ℓ
Next, consider similarity metrics defined by the utilities: For each task cℓ, we take dℓ(i, j) =
|ui(cℓ)− uj(cℓ)|. By the definition of ui, under these similarity metrics, every pair of individuals
i, j ∈ Tℓ × Tℓ are considered similar dℓ(i, j) = 0. We fix D to be the total variation distance, in
other words, D(pc, qc) = |pc − qc|. As such, any allocation π that satisfies IF must show cℓ to every
individual i ∈ Tℓ with some fixed probability αℓ = π(i)cℓ . We can compute the expression for the
average social welfare of any such assignment as a function of the αℓ.
1
|X |
·
n−1∑
ℓ=0
αℓ ·
∑
i∈Tℓ
ui(cℓ) = α0 ·
|S0|
|X |
+
n−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ · t
ℓ ·
|Tℓ|
|X |
= α0 ·
(
1−
n−1∑
ℓ=1
t−ℓ
)
+
n−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ · t
ℓ ·
n−1∑
m=ℓ
t−m (12)
≤ α0 +
n−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ +
n−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ ·
n−1∑
m=ℓ+1
t−m+ℓ
≤
(
n−1∑
ℓ=0
αℓ
)
·
(
1 +
n−1∑
m=2
t−m
)
(13)
= 1 +
n−1∑
m=2
t−m (14)
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where (12) follows by expanding |Tℓ||X | in terms of
|Sm|
|X | = t
−m; (13) applies Hölder’s inequality; and
(14) uses the fact that individuals i ∈ Sn−1 are members i ∈ Tℓ for all ℓ ∈ [n], so the sum of the
probabilities
∑
ℓ αℓ ≤ 1.
Given a desired ε, we can take t large enough, the ratio between the social welfares exceeds n−ε.
Optimality under IF. Intuitively, this construction highlights the fact that allowing further
targeting and more ad campaigns to participate allows the gap in social welfare between the best IF
and PIIF solutions to grow considerably. Note that this gap applies even if the platform’s objective
is to optimize social welfare, so the proof also shows a gap in worst-case utility achievable by the
decision-maker under IF.
We remark that a corollary of our result is that the Dwork-Ilvento “RandomizeThenClassify” mecha-
nism [DI19] for composition under multi-task IF achieves worst-case optimal performance (in terms
of both social welfare and utility to the platform). In particular, [DI19] give an algorithm (in a
setting with limited information modeling “competitive composition”) that allocates a fixed distri-
bution p ∈ ∆(C) to all individuals – thus, satisfying IF – that achieves a 1/ |C|-fraction of the best
unconstrained utility. Our result shows that no IF solution, even with full information, can achieve
a better fraction of the achievable utility.
6 Discussion
In this section, we review additional related work, note some possible extensions within the preference-
informed fairness framework, and conclude with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of our
current approach.
6.1 Further related works
Since [DHP+12], a number of recent works have aimed to extend the “fairness through awareness”
framework, including [RY18, KRR18, GJKR18, KRSM19, JKN+19]. These works focus on trans-
lating the theoretical IF framework into practically-motivated settings.
Three recent works have suggested incorporating notions of individuals’ preferences into the fairness
definitions. First, [BDNP18] present EF as an alternative to IF and study its learning-theoretic
properties. Their focus is on the question of generalization: given a classifier that is envy-free on a
sample, is it approximately envy-free on the underlying distribution? Their main technical result is
a positive answer to this question, when learning from a particular structured family of classifiers.
An interesting open question is whether the generalization results for IF from [RY18] and EF from
[BDNP18] can be combined to give generalization for PIIF.
Second, [ZVR+17] considers two notions of fairness at the (weaker) group level: treatment parity
and impact parity. Their main contribution is a relaxation of both definitions, allowing for solutions
where every protected group is “better off” on average. From a technical perspective, achieving their
notion requires solving a non-convex optimization problem even in the simple case of linear classifiers
for two disjoint groups. Our approach is different in that it focuses on defining both fairness and
preferences at the individual level. This allows for a significantly stronger fairness guarantee, as well
as a much more general framework that supports any notion of benefit or preference individuals may
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have. Importantly, our notion provably admits efficient optimization for a rich class of preference
relations.
Finally, independent of our work, [CIJ19] study and quantify trade-offs between individual fairness
and utility in an online version of the targeted advertising problem. [CIJ19] also observe that IF
can come at a high cost to utility in the multiple-task setting of [DI19], but propose a different
relaxation. Under their notion, every individual i chooses a subset of the outcomes Si ⊆ C and is
guaranteed that their probability of seeing an ad from Si is greater than the probability of every
other individual of seeing an ad from Si. Such a guarantee can be viewed as a variant of EF over
a more restricted class of preferences than those we consider. The main distinction from PIIF is
that this notion ignores the distance metrics entirely and in this sense resembles envy-freeness more
than individual-fairness.
6.2 Preference-informed group fairness
In this work, our focus was on incorporating individual preferences into the metric-based individual
fairness framework Dwork et al. [DHP+12]. The space of fairness definitions, however, is large, and
different definitions may be more appropriate in different contexts.
A different approach for defining fairness, often referred to as “group fairness,” proceeds as follows. A
protected attribute, such as race or gender, induces a partition of the individuals into a small number
of groups. For simplicity, we focus on the case where there is a single protected group, S, where the
rest of the population is denoted T = X \S. A classifier is considered fair if it achieves parity of some
statistical measure across these groups. Group fairness notions are typically weaker than individual
notions of fairness: they only provide a guarantee for the “average” member of the protected groups
and might allow blatant unfairness towards a single individual or even large subgroups; indeed, the
shortcomings of group notions motivated the original work on “fairness through awareness” and
subsequent works [DHP+12, KNRW18, HKRR18, KRR18]. Although group fairness notions can be
fragile, they are widely studied and used due to their simplicity and due to the fact that they are
easier to enforce and implement (for example, they do not require a task-specific similarity metric).
In principle, much of the reasoning behind our argument for incorporating preferences into IF
[DHP+12] also extends to group-fairness notions. In this section, we show how we might augment
a common group notion, called Statistical Parity (SP), to incorporate preferences. When there is a
clearly “desirable” outcome, SP aims to protect the group S by guaranteeing equal average exposure
to the desired outcome.
Definition 6.1 (Statistical parity). A binary classifier h : X → {±1} satisfies (exact) statistical
parity with respect to S if
Pr
i∼S
[h(i) = 1] = Pr
i∼T
[h(i) = 1]
In our context, when individuals have diverse preferences over the outcome space, enforcing SP may
again come at a cost to members of S, the group that SP aims to protect. As a concrete example,
suppose everyone in X prefers the outcome +1, with the exception of some fraction of S, denoted
S′, who prefer the outcome −1. In this case, the statistical parity constraints prevents the solution
where h(i) = +1 for i ∈ X \ S′ and h(i) = −1 for i ∈ S, which from the individuals’ perspective is
optimal.
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Building on this intuition, we extend the set of classifiers we deem fair. Assuming every individual
i ∈ X has a preference relation over {±1} (or even distributions over {±1}), preference-informed
statistical parity (PISP) allows deviations from SP, as long as they are aligned with the individuals’
preferences.
Definition 6.2 (Preference-informed statistical parity). A binary classifier h : X → {±1} satisfies
preference-informed statistical parity with respect to S if there exists an alternative classifier, h′ :
X → {±1} , such that:
∀j ∈ T, h′(j) = h(j)
∀i ∈ S, h(i) i h
′(i)
Pr
i∼S
[
h′(i) = 1
]
= Pr
i∼T
[
h′(i) = 1
]
That is, fixing the outcomes members of T receive under h, every single member of S prefers their
current outcome over what they would have received under a classifier satisfying statistical parity.
Importantly, the guarantee is still with respect to the preferences of the individual members of S.
We conclude with several remarks regarding PISP. First, note that PISP only enriches the set of
solutions that satisfy SP; any classifier that satisfies SP also satisfies PISP, by taking the alternative
h′ = h. The classifier welfare-maximizing classifier, where each individual is assigned their favorite
outcome, is considered fair. For example, revisiting our example above, the classifier that gives +1
to X \ S′, and −1 to S′ is fair, because the alternative classifier that gives everyone +1 satisfies
the PISP constraints. Finally, we argue that PISP maintains the core of the fairness guarantee of
SP. For example, consider the classifier that assigns +1 to members of T and −1 to members of
S. This classifier benefits the members of T in a way that is not aligned with the preferences of all
members in S; rightfully, it does not satisfy PISP, because i ∈ S \ S′ are harmed.
6.3 Revisiting the assumptions underlying PIIF
Three main assumptions underlie our work. The first is that the outcome space is taken as a given.
This could be problematic if the outcomes themselves are biased, e.g., tailored to the preferences of
the majority, or worse yet, harmful to the minority. A biased outcome space would also present a
problem for both IF and EF, which PIIF does not escape entirely. Still, PIIF may ameliorate the
issue, by allowing the minority to receive outcomes that they prefer. We see a study of fairness of
the outcomes themselves as an exciting direction for further inquiry.
The second assumption is that any deviation from an IF solution that is aligned with individuals’
preferences should still be considered fair. This assumption follow from the perspective that “fair”
allocation algorithms should protect the welfare of individuals; this perspective naturally extends the
perspective underlying IF that similar individuals should be treated similarly. As discussed in [Hel16,
Hel19], in other (legal) settings, the notion of “fairness” may necessarily imply “treatment as equal,”
and notions of individual fairness may not apply. In such settings, the societal notion of fairness
may require going against individual preferences. Handling such settings lies beyond the scope of
our current work that focuses on the computer science notions of individual fairness, in which the
objective is to provide strong protections from discrimination to the individuals themselves.
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The third assumption is that the individuals’ preferences are known. This is certainly the most
nontrivial technical assumption we make; nevertheless, there are established techniques for learning
utility-functions from observed behaviour [CKO01]. We also note that accurately learning prefer-
ences could often be in the interest of the decision-maker (for example, ad platforms often claim
that their implementations of targeted advertising are in line with users’ interests [Zuc19]). Still,
any practical estimation of the preferences runs the risk of injecting further bias during the learning
process (for example, if the minority’s preferences are estimated with lesser accuracy) and, therefore,
mandates special attention in future research.
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